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CRIMINOLOGY
PAROLE BOARD DECISION MAKING:
A STUDY OF DISPARITY REDUCTION AND THE IMPACT OF
INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR
MICHAEL R. GO"'FREDSON
INTRODUCTION

Few aspects of criminal justice are currently
undergoing more critical appraisal than the incarceration process.' Nearly every survey of the field
undertaken in the last five years recommends major
reform of current methods for determining which
convicted persons to imprison and what length of
confinement should be imposed. Most recommendations for reform recognize the interdependence
of the parole and sentencing decisions. Consequently, proposals for reform typically affect both
decisons. Nonetheless, much of the concern surrounding the incarceration process centers on the
concept of parole and its contemporary correlate,
the indeterminate term. Although there is a growing consensus about the necessity of either abolition
or substantial modification of the parole function,
there is no consistency in the basis for believing
that such reform is required. In fact, proponents of
change cannot agree on even the most fundamental
effects of the parole process. We are told, for example, that on the one hand, parole leads to decreases in terms of confinement 2 and, on the other,
to increases in time served.3 A lack of rigorous
research in the area encourages such antithetical
claims.
One issue that permeates the sentencing-parole
field is concern for disparity-dissimilar treatment
of equally situated offenders. Numerous reform
proposals concentrate on disparity, including suggestions for sentencing councils and appellate review of sentences as well as legislatively fixed mandatory terms and the abolition of parole.' To many,
the indeterminate term itself accounts for the
'See D. FOGEL, "... WE ARE THE LIVING PROOF"

(1975); N. MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974);
A. voN HIRSCH, DoING JUsTIcE (1976).
2 E. VAN DEN

3

HAAO,

PUNISHING CRIMINALS,

6 (1975).

Cohen, Abolish Parole: Why Not? 46 N.Y. ST. B. J., 51
(1974).
4 See also the proposal to reform the Federal sentencing
structure in S.1437, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).

existence of great disparity in incarceration time?
The lack of adequate guidelines for the type of
information to be considered by the judge in making a disposition, judicial variation in punishment
philosophies, and wide discretion in setting the
term of confinement are often seen as culminating
in gross sentencing disparities.
Under many sentencing structures once the decision to incarcerate has been made the determination of length of confinement is shared between
the judiciary and the paroling authority.6 Within
such a structure, the sentencing judge sets the
outside boundaries of incarceration time, either by
specifying a maximum term, a minimum term or
both. Often, the parole board then determines,
within these confines, the actual time served in
prison. Thus, disparity in the time actually served in
prison, for those jurisdictions that employ such
sentencing-parole structures, is an issue that is relevant to both decision points.
Although reduction of disparity is not one of the
stated goals of most parole systems7, it has been
argued by some that parole boards do serve to
reduce judicially created disparity through the exercise of their discretion in determining the length
of confinement. Recent efforts to change the sen5 Sentence disparity can, of course, take a variety of
forms, including decisions not to prosecute, the incarceration or probation decisi6n, and the decision as to length
of confinement. It is only the decision as to length of
incarceration that will be of concern here because parole
boards, generally, have only had direct influence over this
decision.
6 See V. O'LEARY & K. HANRAHAN, THE ORGANIZATION
OF PAROLE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES

(3d ed. 1976),

for a comprehensive review of paroling policies and practices in the various American jurisdictions. The legislature also plays a significant role by virtue of statutory
restrictions.
7 On the contrary, recidivism, depreciating the seriousness of the offense and rehabilitation, have been the
principal statutory concerns. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
38, § 1003-3-5 (c) (1975).
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tencing-parole process grant increased importance
to ascertaining the validity of such claims about
latent functions of the parole process. According to
the National Advisory Commission on Criminal
Justice Standards and Goals:
Though it is seldom stated openly, parole boards
often are concerned with supporting a system of
appropriate and equitable sanctions. This concern is

reflected in several ways, depending upon ajurisdiction's sentencing system. One of the most common
is through decisions seeking to equalize penalties for
offenders who have similar backgrounds and have
committed the same offense but who have received
different sentences.8

Similarly, the United States Board of Parole reports that "to a very real degree, the Board of
Parole tends, in practice, to equalize [sentencing]
disparity whenever it is not bound to the one-third
maximum time required in 'regular sentencing. '
But the claim that parole boards do serve a sentence disparity-reduction function still is questioned. After studying parole practices in New York
State, one commission has concluded that there is
"no hard evidence" that the parole board "reduces
sentence disparities by paroling those whose offenses are similar after they have served comparable amounts of time."'1
Arguments that parole boards do in fact reduce
unwarranted variation in sentences are often based
on the notion that when one central body makes
decisions in every case, it tends naturally to make
more homogeneous decisions than would numerous
de-centralized decision-makers." Conversely, the
idea that parole boards reduce time-served disparity is often questioned. This is due to the lack of
reliable empirical evidence showing such a reduc'tion, and a belief that parole boards make timeserved decisions in an arbitrary fashion in an attempt to achieve ends like rehabilitation that are
beyond current capabilities. There does exist some
empirical evidence suggesting that state parole
boards may modify disparities arising from plea
negotiations, 12 but the question of whether and to
8 NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS

394 (1973).

9 UNITED STATES BOARD OF PAROLE, ANNUAL REPORT

(1975).
I" Citizen's Inquiry on Parole and Criminal Justice
(1976). Report on New York Parole:A Summary, I l CRIM. L.
BOLL. at 297.
" Of course, not all paroling authorities are entirely
centralized. They do, however, consist of a small number
of decision
makers (in comparison to judges).
12
J.

SHIN, ANALYSIS OF CHARGE

OUTCOMES, (1972).

REDUCTION AND

Is
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what extent parole boards reduce judicial incarceration-time disparity is unknown.
A corollary issue with considerable significance
in light of contemporary sentencing-parole reform proposals is the extent to which post-sentencing factors influence time-served decisions by parole boards. A major historical argument for the
large grant of discretion given paroling authorities
to determine the length of incarceration, was to
provide an opportunity to observe the inmate's
behavior while in prison. In theory, evidence of
prison adjustment, as indicated by compliance
with institutional regulations -and lack of disciplinary actions, and participation in appropriate
treatment programs, would permit the parole
board better to gauge the inmate's prognosis for
successful release from prison. The question of the
extent to which institutional behavior factors influence time-served decisions is of considerable import. If factors unknown at the time of sentencing
are critical in determining actual time served for a
large proportion of inmates, it is obviously important to determine the validity of these factors in
assessing post-release success. If post-sentencing factors are not important in time-served decisions,
then the practice of providing paroling authorities
such wide discretion in time-served decisions is
questionable.13 One purpose of this study, therefore, will be an assessment of the extent to which
selected post-sentencing factors are important in
determinations by parole boards of time actually
served in prison.
Problems in DispariyResearch

The empirical evidence concerning disparity-reduction on the part of parole boards is sparse and
the topic is fraught with difficult analytic and
measurement issues. Numerous theoretical and empirical complications attend any disparity research,
perhaps partially accounting for the lack of evidence on the effect on disparity of decisions made
"3Keeping control withfn the institution is an additional rationale for sentencing-parole structures that permit parole boards to consider institutional behavior in
time-served decisions (see, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 1).
Regardless of the rationale invoked for the use of institutional behavior factors in time-served decisions, one
important question-and the sole concern of the research

reported here-is the extent to which such factors actually influence time-served decisions. It should be
stressed that if it is found that such factors do, in fact,
exert a significant influence on time-served decisions, the
validity of their use, for either institutional control or for
prognosis regarding post-release success, is a separate
issue.
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at various points in the criminal justice system.
One of the principal impediments to research in
the area is the absence of an agreed upon definition
of disparity. For example, it might be argued that
disparity can only be measured against the specific
goals of the sentencing decision. Thus, the factors
that legitimately should be considered in arriving
at a disposition when general deterrence is conceived of as the goal of the sentencing decision may
differ from the factors legitimately relevant if retribution is the sole concern. To the extent that
different decision-makers employ different goals
upon which to base their judgments, it might be
argued that rather than reflecting disparity, differences in dispositions simply reflect differences in
the goals of persons making those decisions.
A second impediment to disparity research is the
difficulty inherent in operationalizing important
concepts. For instance, equity in sentencing might
require that offenders with similar offenses and
prior records be afforded similar treatment. The
measurement difficulty, of course, is how to operationalize these concepts. Categories of conviction
offense are most often extremely heterogeneous in
the offense behavior that they encompass. Thus,
when conviction offense is "held constant" in disparity research, there may still be much uncontrolled variance within categories. Similar problems of scaling and measurement are associated
with prior record variables.
Additional complications arise when the aim is
to examine the influence of several decisions on
disparity. For example, design constraints impede
research in the area of disparity reduction by parole
boards. Optimally, what is required for an empirical assessment of this problem is an experimental
design including random allocation to groups with
and without subsequent parole board review as to
length of incarceration.
Further complicating the problem for researchers is the lack of comparable data available to both
the sentencing judge and the paroling authorities
for the same offenders. Thus, a special data collection effort is required for a study of the problem.
Finally, major complications in the empirical study
of disparity reduction are introduced by the myriad
legal restrictions imposed on both the judiciary
and the paroling authorities that can make simple
comparisons extremely misleading.
The centrality of the disparity issue to the contemporary call for fundamental reform in the sentencing-parole process lends increased importance
to attempts to resolve these impediments to empirical study of claims about the latent functions of

parole. A more solid empirical basis for discussion
than that currently available is thus required. The
major purpose of this paper is to begin an exploration of whether and to what extent one parole
board has reduced time-served disparity arising
from the dispositions from several courts. Unlike
much prior research on the topic of sentencing
disparity, emphasis will be placed on the interdependence of the sentencing and parole decisionmakers and the effect that multiple decisions have
on incarceration disparity.
THE STUDY

The Sample and the Data
To explore the questions of whether and to what
extent parole boards reduce judicial disparity in
incarceration length and to consider the influence
of institutional behavior on time-served decisions,
a sample of adult parole cases was obtained from
the United States Board of Parole. This sample,
which was drawn in conjunction with a larger
study,,' 4 consists of random samples of releases by
the Board of Parole in 1970, 1971 and 1972. Because of substantial differences in statutory limitations on maximum and minimum allowable sentences between juvenile and adult cases, only adult
cases are studied here. Additionally, persons sentenced under specialized statutes, such as the 1966
Narcotic Addict Rehabilitation Act'" were excluded from this sample.16 Finally, only new court
14The data used in this study were collected as part of
a parole decision-making project directed by Don M.
Gottfredson and Leslie T. Wilkins in collaboration with
the United States Board of Parole. Their permission to
use the data is greatly appreciated. The coding procedures and definitions of terms are reported in D. Gottfredson.& S. Singer, Parole Decision-Making Coding Manual,
Supplemental Report Two, (Research Center, National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, Davis, California,
1973). The proportion of cases drawn by year are as
follows: For 1970, 50 %of the cases between January and
June and 20 %of the cases between July and December
were randomly selected resulting in 2,497 cases; for 1971,
30 % of the cases between July and December were
randomly selected resulting in 1,138 cases; for 1972, 30
%of the cases between January and June were randomly

selected resulting in 1,011 cases. The sample was drawn
prior to the adoption by the Parole Board of the guideline
system (see Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making ParolingPolicy Explicit, 21 CRIME AND DELINQUENCY 34
(1975)), and, therefore, the results of this study may have

greater applicability to other jurisdictions that have not
established similar discretion structuring mechanisms.
is 18 U.S.C. § § 4251-54 (1976).
36 Persons

receiving "regular adult" sentences under

18 U.S.C. § 4205 (1976) comprised 75 %of the sample.
Of those excluded, Youth Corrections Act cases comprised the vast majority (18 %of the total sample).
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commitments (i.e., not parole or probation violators) were included in the sample.
The federal sentencing structure allows thejudge
to select among several types of incarceration dispositions for adults.17 In this sample, the most
commonly used alternative (sixty-five percent of
the cases) is the "regular adult" sentence, in which
the inmate becomes eligible for parole after serving
one-third of the full sentence.' 8 The full sentence is
selected by the judge within statutory confines.
Alternatively, the judge may sentence under a
section that allows the judge to set the maximum
term within statutory confines and to set the date
of eligibility for parole at some time earlier than
one-third of the maximum. 19 This option accounts
for two percent of the cases in the sample. Additionally, an offender may be sentenced under a
section that permits the judge to set the maximum
term and the parole board to set the earliest parole
eligibility date.20 This option accounted for thirtytwo percent of the cases in the sample. Persons
sentenced under these options and who were either
paroled, mandatorily released or released by virtue
of the expiration of their sentence as of 1973, were
defined as the study group for the research. Thus,
not only is the judicially set sentence length known
for each inmate, but the actual time served as
determined by the parole board is known as well.
The final study sample consists of 2,833 persons.
For each person in the sample, a wide variety of
personal characteristics, prior record information,
current offense information, and prison experience
variables were collected. The reliability of the individual items in the data set was found to be
acceptably high with reliability coefficients for
most items well above 0.8.21
These data are suited for exploring the issue of
parole board disparity reduction for several reasons. Both sentencing data from numerous Federal
Districts and decision-makers and time-served data
are known for each case. Thus, the two types of
decisions relevant to the question-judicial determination of sentence length and parole board determination of time served-can be studied for
each person in the sample. Also, this data set
17See Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L. J. 810 (1975), for a description
of Federal sentencing practices.
'8 18 U.S.C. § 4205 (a) (1976).
'9 Id. at § 4205 (b) (1) (1976).
20 Id. at § 4205 (b) (2) (1976).
21 See J. Beck, S. Singer, W. Brown, & G. Pasela, The

Reliability of Information in the Parole Decision-Making
Study (National Council on Crime and Delinquency
1973).
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contains a wealth of factors that may influence
both judicial and parole decisions as to incarceration time-from several indicators of prior record
and offense type to prison behavior items22-an
essential requirement if adequate controls on factors influencing sentence are to be exercised in

defining disparity. Additionally, the sentencing-parole structure in existence in the Federal system at
the time these data were collected is similar to that
found in many jurisdictions, although the types of
offense may be dissimilar. Finally, the number of
cases available is sufficiently large to permit multivariate analyses of the problem. The question of
the influence of institutional behavior factors on
time-served decisions is also capable of study, as an
effort was made to collect such items that are
presented to the parole board for their consideration. Thus, both time-served and some indicants of
institutional behavior are known for each person
in the sample.
It should be stressed that the data studied here
were collected prior to the implementation by the
United States Parole Commission of new guidelines 23 and that, therefore, these results should not
be viewed as reflective of the current practices of
that board. The current practices of the United
States Parole Commission depart significantly from
the practices during the period of time reflected in
these data in ways that could exert a considerable
influence on the disparity question. Although these
findings will not be indicative of disparity reduction in the current Federal System, the operation
of the Federal Parole Commission at the time these
22 The following is a list of offense and prior record
items used in the study. Precise definitions of terms and
coding instructions may be found in D. Gottfredson & S.
Singer, supra note 14.

1. Type of Sentence-simple, consecutive, concurrent
2.
3.
4.
5.

Conviction offense-26 categories
Weapon in offense (and type)
Weapon with injury
Any indication of assault (regardless of conviction
category)
6. Seriousness score (see Footnote 32)
7. Dollar value of loss
8. Type of crime on first arrest
9. Age at first arrest
10. Age at first conviction
11. Longest time free since first commitment
12. Longest time served on any commitment
13. Prior prison commitments
14. Other prior sentences
15. Prior probation sentences
16. Number of prior incarcerations (including jail)
17. Probation or parole revocations
218. Prior convictions (number and type)
3See note 14, supra.
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data were collected was similar to the current
operation of most parole boards.
Method of Assessing the Dispariy Reduction Hypothesis
As usually understood, disparity means that
equally situated persons are treated differently at
some stage of the criminal justice process. At the
decision point of interest here, disparity means that
equally situated offenders are sentenced to different
lengths of incarceration. There are numerous potential sources for such disparity. It may arise from
inconsistency due to individual judges over time,
from inconsistency among different judges within
a district, from inconsistency among judges in different districts, or from all three. There are two
components of the concept of disparity that require
operational definitions for the purpose of this
study: One considers what is meant by inconsistent
or different treatment; and the other questions
what is meant by "equally situated offenders". The
first component will simply be indicated by variation in the maximum sentence length (for judicial
decisions) and in time actually served in prison
before first release (for parole board decisions).
When "equally situated offenders" receive equal
maximum sentence lengths in months, there is no
judicial disparity as measured hereU and when
"equally situated offenders" serve equal amounts
of time in prison there is no parole board disparity
as the term is used here.
The second component of disparity-what is
meant by "equally situated offenders"-is, as noted
above, much more difficult to operationalize in a
satisfactory fashion. There are obviously numerous
factors that may be considered by both judges and
parole board members in setting length of confinement. Depending on the goal of incarceration that
is being pursued by the decision-maker (i.e., general
deterrence, incapacitation, retribution, or treatment) the offender's prior record, the seriousness of
the conviction offense, the offender's family situation, and the prognosis for recidivism are but a few
of the factors that may influence the disposition
and, hence, be applicable in defining "equally
situated offenders." As noted above, the numerous
potential aims of incarceration, with their concommitant differences in "legitimate" sentencing criteria, have led some to argue that disparity cannot
be measured and, therefore, cannot be studied
empirically.
'The maximum sentence length was chosen as the
most appropriate indicant of judicial disposition since
under most sentencing alternatives it defines the range of
feasible incarceration time.

It is unsatisfactory to argue, however, that because two judges differ in the goals that they employ
in fixing sentence, disparity cannot be measured.
The point of reference for disparity should be the
dispositions given to two or more equally situated
offenders. If they receive different dispositionsregardless of differences in purpose for these dispositions-they have been treated differently. If two
judges have identical cases and one, operating so
as to maximize deterrent goals, incarcerates for two
years and the other, operating so as to maximize
rehabilitative goals, incarcerates for five years, even
though these separate terms may be legitimately
related to the goal of the decision, a disparate
result, from the point of view of the offenders at
least, has been achieved.2s
Although there is considerable disagreement
over which factors should not be considered in
sentencing decisions, there is a good deal of consensus that the characteristics of the offense and the
prior criminal record of the offender should be
influential.2s That is, although scholars differ somewhat in the extent to which other factors are seen
as permissible in setting punishment, there is a
growing body of sentencing literature that suggests
that the seriousness of what the offender has done
and the extent and nature of the offender's prior
criminal conduct should determine the sanction
received. There is considerable rationale, therefore,
for operationalizing the concept of "equally situated offenders" in terms of these factors. The concept, "equally situated offenders" was thus operationally defined for the purpose of this study as
persons with similar current offense and prior record statuses. The data used are relatively rich in
the amount of information concerning the prior
criminal history of the offender and the factors
making up the current offense.27
Two phases of the research were designed to
address the disparity reduction hypothesis. First,
multiple linear regression was used to assess the
25 Some scholars argue for the propriety of this form of
sentencing disparity (see, e.g., N. MORRIS, supra note 1.)
The purpose of this research is to attempt to determine
whether parole boards reduce judicial incarceration disparity, regardlessof the source (or propriety) of such disparity.
i See e.g., note
I supra.

27 See note 22 supra. One limitation of this method is
that it is certainly possible that there exist important
current offense or prior record dimensions that are not
reflected in the items available for study and which would
be useful in defining equally situated offenders. It is
argued, however, that the major factors thought to be
relevant in making such assessments are included.
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amount of variation explained by the same set of
offense and prior record variables for both the
sentence-length and time-served decisions. The rel-.
ative amount of unexplained variation serves as a
rough indicator of disparity after the offense and
prior record variables are taken into account.2
Thus, a reduction in unexplained variation would
be expected if the paroling authority was markedly
reducing disparity in respect to similar circumstances of offense and prior record. Second, because
the method of regression analysis used is limited in
the extent to which significant subgroup differences
that might exist are uncovered, a search for such
subgroups was undertaken by means of tabular
analysis, comparing disparity directly for specific
groups of offenders with similar offenses and prior
record.
Results

Table 1 summarizes the sentence length and
time-served data for the cases in the study. Whereas
the standard deviation for sentence length is over
twice as great as the standard deviation for timeserved, the coefficient of variation for time-served
is thirteen percent smaller than for sentence
length.2 The similarity between the two decisions
on this statistic indicates that the relative variability of the two decisions is fairly similar; rather than
sharply reducing the variability in sentence
lengths, the time-served (i.e., parole board) decision
apparently moves the individual cases down the
scale of months served, thus affecting the variance
of the two samples, but much less substantially
affecting the relative variability about the mean.
These data indicate that, on the average, these
inmates served about fifty-two percent of their
maximum sentences. The bivariate correlation
coefficient between sentence length and timeserved is quite high (r = +.85).
The findings that there is no large difference in
the relative variability in time-served and sentence
length and that sentence length and time-served
are highly correlated casts some doubt on the
hypothesis that parole board decisions substantially reduce sentence-length disparity. However, it
could still be possible that a greater proportion of
28See note 31 infra.

' The coefficient of variation standardizes the sample
standard deviation to the sample mean. It is, therefore,
useful in comparisons of relative homogeneity when
groups have very different means.
Variances computed on logarithmic transformations
of sentence-length and time-served yielded comparable
results: time-served = .46; sentence-length = .51.
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the variation in time-served decisions is accounted
for by offense and prior record items than is the
variation in sentence length. Under the operational
definitions set forth for this study, if this were the
case, then regardless of the relative variability between the two decision points, time-served decisions
would be less disparate. In order to address this
question, both time-served in prison and sentencelength were regressed on the same set of offense
and prior record variables. The large number of
offense and prior record items available for analysis
required that as a first step the number of independent variables be reduced. Thus, items with a
significant bivariate association with either sentence-length or time-served were allowed to remain
in the analysis. Under the operational definitions
set forth here, if the parole board did reduce judicial disparity, then a greater proportion of the
variance in time-served than in sentence length
will be explained by these offense and prior record
variables. If similar proportions of explained variance between the two decisions is found, or if less
of the variance in time-served is accounted for
relative to sentence-length, then this will be construed as evidence
against the disparity reduction
31
hypothesis.

The step-wise regression results for both sentence-length and time-served are presented in
Table 2. For sentence-length, a total of six variables
entered the equation in the step-wise analysis before additional variables added less than one percent to the explained variation (prior violent record
and current violent offense, current conviction on
assault, the seriousness of the charged offense, the
number of counts on the current commitment,
prior prison sentences, and the seriousness of the
conviction offense),3 These items accounted for
" It should be stressed that the present study is not
attempting to discover the specific factors most influential
in determining sentence-length and time-served. Rather
the criteria set for this analysis are the total amounts of
variation explained in these decision outcomes by offense
and prior record items. Obviously, some of these independent variables are highly interrelated. In addition to
the items shown in note 22, supra, a limited search was
undertaken to discover joint effects that would add additional explanatory power to the set of independent
variables. Variables consisting of various combinations of
present offense type and prior record experience, weapon
use and prior record experience, and so forth were also
constructed. These were added as additional variables.
Thus, for example, attributes were constructed that
placed persons with both a violent prior record and a
current violent offense in one category and all others in
another.
2 The seriousness score values were defined by an
unpublished study by D.M. Gottfredson for offense be-
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TABLE I
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS ON SENTENCE-LENGTH AND TIME-SERVED

Maximum Sentence-length
(in months)a
Time-served
(in months)

Number

Mean

Variance

Standard
D

ofCoefficient
Variation

2829

52.4

2373.6

44.7

.93

2829

27.3

478.1

21.9

.80

' Life sentences were coded as 540 months, because it was necessary to establish an interval scale classification.
Under Federal law the minimum parole eligibility for persons sentenced to life is 15 years and the typical minimum
parole eligibility for regular adult sentences is one-third of the maximum sentence. Thus, three times 15 years is 540
months.

approximately forty percent of the variation in study, time-served decisions are no less disparate
sentence-length:3 Thus, for this sample of cases than are sentence-length decisions in this sample.
The high correlation in this sample between
and using the offense and prior record variables
available for study, only a moderate amount of time-served and sentence-length, when compared
variation in sentence-length is accounted for. There with the moderate associations between the offense
is, therefore, under the criteria established for this and prior record variables and time-served, indistudy, considerable room for disparity (the unex- cates that the best overall predictor of time-served
plained variance) to be reduced by the parole is judicial sentence length. To some extent such a
correlation is logically necessary; after all, the maxboard.
Also shown in Table 2 are the results of an imum and minimum amounts of time served in
identical analysis using time-served as the depen- prison are constrained by where on the scale of
dent variable. Seven variables, six of which were punishment the judge sets the penalty. However,
identical to those entering the sentence-length so- the large proportion of variation unexplained by
lution, entered before additional variables added offense and prior record found in this study for
less than one percent to the explained variation. Of sentence-length left considerable room for disparity
interest is the fact that the two solutions accounted reduction, as defined here, on the part of the parole
for almost identical proportions of explained vari- board. These results indicate, however, that for this
ation. In fact, slightly less of the variation in time- sample the parole board decisions were highly
served is accounted for by offense and prior record consistent with the sentencing decision. Of course,
variables. Thus, under the criteria establishedfor this it might be the case that other offense and prior
record factors or their combinations not included
in this data set could reduce the unexplained varhavior categories developed by M. Warren and E. Reimer for use in a "Parole Movement Scale" in the Re- iation in sentence-length and thus reduce the apsearch Division of the California Department of Correc- parent disparity found here.3
tions. The scale values are the median scores obtained for
' As noted in the introduction, it has been claimed
each item in a decision game in which parole board
members and correctional administrators were asked to that the disparity reduction function of the Federal Paindicate the probability of successful parole required for role Board is most effective in those situations in which
parole release after serving the average (median) time for the Board is not constrained by the mandatory one-third
the particular offense/behavior category. The score val- minimum sentence of the "Regular Adult" sentence opues range from 235 for bigamy to 887 for acts of delib- tion. This possibility was examined here by employing
erate, planned violence causing death of an adult. For identical procedures reported above for the total sample,
the exact scale values and the rules used for coding but only within those cases sentenced under 18 U.S.C. §
offenses from case files, see D. Gottfredson & S. Singer, 4205 (b) (2)-cases for which the parole sets the minimum
supra note 14. Clearly, this scale is only a rough measure parole eligibility date up to one-third of the maximum
of offense seriousness, defined by a restricted group of (approximately one-third of the sample). For these cases
persons. It does, however, serve to classify offenses in (N=746) time-served and sentence-length were less
terms of behavioral elements (e.g., value of loss, degree of strongly correlated than for the total sample (r - .68);
injury, extent of monetary loss, and presence of weapons) however, the results of the regression analysis were also
and may therefore be preferable to a simple hierarchy not supportive of the disparity reduction hypotheses.
Thus, 45 % of the variation in sentence-length was exbased on statutory classifications.
mA regression using the logarithm of sentence length plained by three factors (current offense was robbery,
as the dependent variable produced virtually identical simple versus consecutive sentences, and seriousness of
the charged offense) before additional entrants explained
results.
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Although these results cast doubt on the hypotheses that time-served decisions serve a substantial disparity reduction function, it is possible that
the type of analysis undertaken thus far masks
important subgroup differences in the extent to
which parole decisions reduce disparity in sentencelength decisions. That is, there may be some specfic
types of offenses for which parole boards do reduce
the variation in sentence-length (and others for
which they increase it). If such subgroups do exist,
the method of analysis used so far would not so
demonstrate. Therefore, a study was made, within
the constraints posed by the size of the sample, to
ascertain whether the reduction hypotheses is supportable when subcategories of equally situated
offenders are viewed separately.
All cases in the sample were classified according
to level of seriousness.s Categories with over 150
cases were selected for further study, resulting in
the definition of seven seriousness categories. Each
category was then further subdivided on the basis
of type of sentence (simple versus concurrent and
consecutive) and prior convictions (none versus at
least one). Obviously, the number of cases available
places limitations on the number of factors that
can be controlled in this type of analysis. Categories
that contained at least fifty cases after these controls were applied were then analyzed for evidence
of disparity reduction. The resulting subgroups
(shown in Table 3) can be described as cases homogeneous with respect to offense, seriousness, sentence type, and prior record. Admittedly, these
controls are somewhat crude; however, they do
serve to classify the sample into fairly homogeneous
groups on the basis of items relevant to the disparity issue. The classifications shown in Table 3
account for forty-two percent of the parent sample.
Table 3 shows that for each of the classifications
defined for analysis the mean sentence-length is
considerably greater than the mean time-served.
As noted earlier, this simply reflects the fact that
most persons do not serve the maximum sentence
given by the court and thus emphasizes the importance of studying issues like disparity across several
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less than one percent of the variance. For time-served, 39
%of the variation was explained by six factors (current
offense was a robbery, the longest time served on prior
prison commitments, prior prison sentences, simple versus

consecutive sentences, longest time free between prison
commitments, and the seriousness of the charged offense).

"2

35 See note 32 supra. The classifications of seriousness

S

used are those reported in D. Gottfredson & S. Singer,
supra note 14.
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TABLE 3
SENTENCE LENGTH AND TIME SERVED FOR SELECTED CLASSIFICATIONS
Sentence-Length" (months)

Classification

Forgery under $500, simple sentence, at
least one prior conviction (N = 167)
Car Theft (unplanned), simple sentence,
at least one prior conviction (N = 217)
Forgery over $500, simple sentence, at
least one prior conviction (N = 89)
Theft (planned), simple sentence, at least
one prior conviction (N = 291)
Car Theft (planned), simple sentence, at
least one prior conviction (N = 284)
Selling narcotic for profit, simple sentence, at least one prior conviction (N

Standard
Men Deviation

Coefficient
o
Variation

Time-Served (months)

Mtnnda
ofMen
Men

Stadard Coefficient
of
Deviations
o
Variation

37.5

22.8

.61

20.6

10.8

.52

32.9

14.1

.43

21.2

9.9

.47

50.5

26.4

.52

26.8

15.1

.56

33.8

20.5

.61

17.8

11.4

.64

35.5

15.4

.43

21.1

9.4

.44

56.3

31.3

.56

31.5

18.8

.60

37.0

13.1

.35

16.8

3.6

21

= 54)

Selective service violation, simple sentence, at least one prior conviction (N
= 136)

decision points. Of most relevance to the disparity- which demonstrates the greatest disparity reducreduction hypothesis are the columns labeled "coef- tion as defined here, was the group with the smallficient of variation". It can easily be seen that, est standard deviation on sentence length. These
overall, the differences in the coefficients of varia- data indicate, therefore, that some subgroup diftion between sentence-length and time-served are ferences in the extent to which parole boards affect
not large; however, some subgroup differences do judicial disparity may exist, and that such reducexist. In five of the seven comparisons there is tions may vary in magnitude according to the
virtually no difference in the two measures. In two particular offense under consideration.3 These regroups, there is some evidence in favor of the sults also indicate that such reductions are not
reduction hypothesis. For cases involving forgery consistent for all categories of offenses.
under $500 with simple sentences and at least one
prior conviction, the standard deviation for sen- The Influence of InslitutionalBehavior on Time-Served
tence length is sixty-one percent of the mean,
These data clearly suggest that the major indiwhereas for the identical cases the standard devia- cator of time-served in prison is judicial sentence
tion for time-served is fifty-two percent of the length. Although there is considerable evidence
mean, a reduction of fifteen percent. For cases that the parole board moves penalties down the
involving selective service violations with simple scale of severity, indications are that this is done
sentences and at least one prior conviction, the systematically with little reduction in variability
standard deviation for sentence length is thirty-five
percent of the mean whereas for time-served the
'7The analyses reported in table 3 were repeated for
standard deviation is twenty-two percent of the the subgroups shown regardless of type of sentence (i.e.,
6
mean, a reduction of thirty-seven percent. Of cases were included whether the sentence was simple,
interest is the finding that this latter classification, consecutive or concurrent). It might be thought that
disparity arising from sentence type (i.e., otherwise simi36 The coefficient of variation is dependent on the larly situated offenders given different types ofsentences)
standard deviation which in turn may be highly influ- is reduced by the parole board. Disparity of this type is,
enced by a few extreme scores. In order to ensure against of course, more difficult to operationalize. However, for
the possibility that a few extreme cases were responsible the subgroups shown in Table 3 the results, in terms of
for the apparent reduction in variability for the two differences between the coefficients of variation, are esclasses discussed above, an identical analysis was per- sentially the same. One exception are cases of planned
formed using only cases falling between the 10th and theft with at least one prior conviction in which the
90th percentiles on the sentence-length distribution. The coefficient variation for time-served is 11 %less than for
results were similar to those reported in the text.
sentence length.

MICHAEL R. GO7TFREDSON

for similarly situated offenders. The question therefore arises whether factors uniquely known to the
parole board appreciably affect the parole board's
decision of time-served. As noted earlier, the ability
to witness institutional behavior prior to setting a
release date has served as a major justification for
such delayed penalty-setting sentencing structures.
Perhaps the institutional behavior of most concern-both to post-release prognosis and to the
theory of parole release as a mechanism of institutional control-is rule infraction. Consistent inability to comply with prison regulations can be
viewed as evidence of increased probability of future law violation, and the threat of a longer prison
stay might be an effective deterrent to institutional
rule infraction. Several rule infraction items that
were available to the parole board for their decisions were available for this part of the study. First,
the number of prison punishments on the current
stay was coded, defined as any action (other than
dismissal) on charges of violations of prison rules
resulting in withholding of privileges, segregation,
isolation, loss of good time, any suspended sentencE, or other deprivation. Second, prison assaultive infractions were coded, defined as any assault
or threat to assault, resulting in a disciplinary
infraction during the present confinement, unless
there was a finding of not guilty. Thus, while the
first item gives an indication of the frequency of
rule-breaking, the second item gives some indication of the seriousness of such infractions. Third,
whether or not the inmate had a record of escape
or attempted escape from prison during the present
confinement was coded. 38
Institutional behavior items other than those
relating to rule infractions, such as successful participation in treatment programs, -are obviously of
additional theoretical interest in a study of timeserved decisions. Unfortunately, data relating to
treatment participation were only partially available for this study and therefore were not included
in the analysis. The emphasis on disciplinary issues,
however, most notably in contemporary reform
proposals,3 9 suggests that there is considerable
merit in ascertaining their influence in reality on
time-served decisions. The bivariate correlations
between the rule infraction items and time-served

in prison (n = 2506; each significant at the p. <
.05 level) were as follows: escape history, r = .10;
assaultive infractions, r = .14; and prison punishment, r = .24.
The question posed for this portion of the study
was whether institutional behavior had a significant impact on time-served for the persons in the
sample once the judicial decision as to sentence
length was taken into account. Essentially, the
purpose was to discover the extent to which the
parole board modified judicial decisions on the
basis of knowledge about institutional infractions.
To address this issue, predicted scores for timeserved were formed on the basis of the linear
regression equation obtained by regressing timeserved on sentence-length. From these predicted
score values, residual scores were derived for each
person in the sample. The total variation in these
residual scores (which was twenty-eight percent of
the total variation in time-served) was then treated
as the dependent variable for a multiple linear
regression that treated the institutional behavior
items as independent variables. A step-wise solution was used with only items adding at least one
percent of the variance in the residual scores permitted to enter. It should be stressed that the
purpose of this analysis was not to determine which
items, among those available for study, were most
determinative of time-served. Rather, the purpose
was to determine the proportion of variability remaining in time-served once the judicial decision
as to sentence-length was taken into account that
could be accounted for by these institutional behavior items. The results are presented in Table 4.
The two institutional behavior items entering
the regression equation together account for less
than ten percent of the residual variation in timeserved. Thus, there is evidence that institutional
behavior of inmates may influence the time served
in prison, but that the influence is not large. It

TABLE 4
MULTIPLE LINEAR REGRESSION

OF

RESIDUAL VARIATION

ON INSTITUTIONAL BEHAVIOR ITEMS

Variable

-8There are limitations involved in using these items
as indicators of prison rule infractions. Perhaps most
important is the insensitivity of these items to the seriousness of the infractions, which is only partially overcome by the assault item. For this reason, the results of
this phase of study should be viewed cautibusly.
9 See N. MORRIS, supra note 1.
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Multi-

Coeflicient of

pie R

Determination

Change in
Coefficient of

Determination

Number of prison
punishments

.26

.068

.068

Escape history

.28

.080

.012

' All inclusions significant at the p. < .05 level; N
2,506.
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might be that part of the reason that these items
are not found to exert a greater influence on timeserved decisions is their relative rarity in the sample. Only seventeen percent of the sample had any
prison punishment, only three percent had assaultive infractions, and only two percent had an escape history during the current commitment. The
fact that this sample represents federal inmates
might limit the generalizability of these results to
state systems where institutional infractions might
be more frequent.

sible mitigating and aggravating circumstances are
large. The possibility exists that significant factors
not included in the data set, and important in
defining equally situated offenders, exist and that
these factors effect the variation in time-served
more than in sentence length, and that, therefore,
the disparity reduction hypothesis is more tenable
than these results suggest. It is argued, however,
that the major factors most often regarded as important in defining equally situated offenders were
available and that if a substantial and consistent
disparity reduction effect with respect to offense
SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS
and prior record were present, then this analysis
would have found more evidence of it.
These results suggest that for the sample studied,
This study, as well as prior research, has indithe parole board substantially reduced the time
actually served in prison from the maximum judi- cated that a good deal of variation in sentences
cially set sentence length, but overall the relative exists that cannot be attributed to either variations
in offense or variations in prior record. The results
reduction in variability in sentences for similarly
situated offenders was not large. The extent of the of this study can shed some light on the crucial
reduction in variability for similarly situated of- question facing many sentencing reform proposfenders was found to vary somewhat according to als-what are the prospects that these proposals
will substantially reduce this unwarranted variathe specific category of offense and prior record
tion in sentences? One implication of these results
studied, suggesting that the disparity reduction
is that it is probably incorrect to assume that a
function of parole boards may have a differential
systematic review of sentences, which includes senimpact according to offense and offender charactence equalization as only a latent purpose, is likely
teristics. Larger sample sizes than those available
here would be required for a more intensive study to achieve substantial reductions in disparity.
Without an explicit charge to look for and to rectify
of the differential disparity reduction hypothesis. If
unwarranted variation-and, importantly, in the
differential effects were uncovered in future research, the current findings would suggest that absence of concrete guidelines defining the boundthey might vary in magnitude according to the aries of "equally situated offenders" within which
to judge consistency and inconsistency-systematic
specific offense under consideration.
review may simply be a matter of penalty substiThe results of this study also suggest that parole
tution rather than a matter of meaningful disparity
boards do modify sentencing decisions on the basis
of institutional behavior, but that these modifica- reduction. These results suggest that simply the
fact that a smaller group of decision makers is
tions account for a relatively small proportion of
involved in reviewing sentences than is involved in
the sentence-modification variation. In jurisdicinitially setting the penalty does not in and of itself
tions where institutional misconduct is more freensure more consistent sentences.
quent or, perhaps, more serious, time-served deciSeveral reform proposals retain broad judicial
sions by parole boards may be more greatly infludiscretion in setting terms of imprisonment and
enced by it. For this sample, however, instutional
place emphasis on some form of sentence review,
behavior of the inmates did not appear to be a
either by an administrative agency or by the judisubstantial consideration in how long offenders
would spend in prison. Of course, the question of ciary4 0 as a means to reduce unwarranted sentencing variation. These are not likely to succeed,
the validity of using institutional behavior as a
factor in time-served decisions-either as predictive judging by these results, unless explicit guidelines
are formulated and mechanisms are instituted to
of post-release success or as a deterrent to instituensure that they play a significant role in the
tional misconduct-is a separate empirical issue.
review process.
This study has several limitations that might
One current reform strategy that places considhave affected the results. Most importantly the
operational definition of disparity is open to ques40 An example is a proposal that emphasizes appellate
tion. This is always the case in research of this type review.
See D.A. Thomas, Equity in Sentencing (Sixth
in the absence of an experimental design with a Annual Pinkerton Lecture, School of Criminal Justice,
random allocation component. The number of pos- State University of New York at Albany, April, 1977).
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erable emphasis on equalizing sentences is the allow considerable discretion in setting sentences
guideline approach adopted by the Federal Parole by the judiciary to accommodate the vagaries of
Commission (as noted, subsequent to the period of individual cases argue that discretion in pursuit of
time studied here).4 Under this strategy, time- individualized justice is inevitable-if not provided
served decisions are made within guidelines reflect- for at the sentencing stage of the criminal justice
ing parole prognosis and offense severity. This process it will manifest itself at earlier stages (e.g.
approach serves to raise the historically latent func- in charging decisions by prosecutors). Rather than
tion of disparity reduction by parole boards to a eliminating disparity, it is argued that eliminating
central decision-making criterion. Whether this judicial discretion (as, for example, by rigid pre42
purpose is well served by this approach is a matter sumptive sentencing) simply makes it less visible.
To the extent that these arguments are valid, efforts
for empirical inquiry.
to curtail judicial disparity in sentence length could
reduction
prodisparity
The critical issue facing
posals is the ability to balance the interests of be made more effective by emphasizing subsequent
equity against the interests of individualized jus- review, but the results of this study indicate that
tice. Proponents of contemporary proposals that review not specifically aimed at disparity reduction
is probably inadequate.
"' See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler, & Wilkins, supra
42
See Thomas, supra note 40.
note 14.

